insights team, the Global Insights Initiative. Quite apart from the work undertaken by these new behavioural public policy units, the ad-hoc implementation of behavioural science-informed policy interventions around the world continues apace.
The ways in which behavioural economics and, more broadly, behavioural science might be used to inform policy is a theme that we will return to later in this book. However, in order to understand properly what behavioural public policy might have to offer, some knowledge of the most robust findings of behavioural economics is warranted. Chapter 2 will describe some of these findings, which were a response to pre-existing assumptions of rationality in mainstream economics. A good behavioural public policy analyst ought to have some knowledge of these origins.
the origins of economic rationality
Economics as a formal field of study did not exist until the latter part of the eighteenth century. Up until that time, mathematicians assumed that when faced with a choice between two options, with each option offering a probability of winning an amount of money, a rational individual would choose that which offered the greatest expected value. For example, the expected value of a lottery that offers a 50% chance of winning $100 and a 50% chance of winning $0 is $50 (i.e., 0.5*100 + 0.5*0), and the expected value of a lottery that offers a 25% chance of winning $160 and a 75% chance of winning $0 is $40 (i.e., 0.25*160 + 0.75*0). Most seventeenth-century mathematicians would have therefore assumed that a rational individual would prefer the former lottery over the latter, if the prices of both lotteries were reasonable and equal. In 1713, in a correspondence with the mathematician Pierre Rémond de Montmort, however, Nicolas Bernoulli questioned whether the assumption of expected value maximisation was always appropriate (Bernoulli, 1738; Zabell, 1990) . Bernoulli devised an ingenious game, known as the St Petersburg paradox, to illustrate his point. The game involves the tossing of a fair coin and the participation of an individual who is informed that he will be paid a prize on the landing of the first head. Bernoulli used ducats as his currency of choice, but the example works with all denominations. Let us thus assume that the individual is informed that he will be paid $2 n for his participation in the game, where n is the number of tosses required for the first head to land. The individual is then asked how much he is willing to pay to play the game.
the origins of behavioural public policy
According to the principle of expected value maximisation, the individual should be willing to pay everything he owns, because the expected value of the game is infinite. To see this, note that the probability of the first head landing on the first toss of the coin is 0.5, in which case the individual is paid $2 1 = $2. The probability of the first head landing on the second toss is 0.25, in which case the individual is paid $2 2 = $4, and if the first head lands on the third toss, which it will with a probability of 0.125, the payoff is $2 3 = $8. The expected value of the game is calculated by summing all of the payoffs, weighted by their related probabilities of occurrence, associated with the first head landing on any particular toss of the coin. Numerically, this is given by:
Bernoulli recognised that people are likely to be willing to pay only quite modest amounts of money to play the St Petersburg game.
Indeed, Allais (1990) (Bernoulli, 1738) . He argued that the subjective value of money increases at a decreasing rate and that lotteries, rather than being evaluated in terms of their expected value, are evaluated in terms of their expected subjective value. This relationship between subjective value -or what is commonly referred to in the economic literature as utility -and money is illustrated in Figure 1 .1, and has been a key assumption in the development of economic theory over the past two centuries. Note: The declining marginal subjective value, or utility, curve is known as a concave utility function. It demonstrates that the utility enjoyed from a relatively large amount will be less than double the utility of an amount that is half as large. For example, the utility of $200 in Figure 1 .1 is less than double the utility of $100. Similarly, the utility given by an additional, or marginal increase of, say, $5 on top of $200 will be less than the utility given by $5 on top of $100. In standard economic theory, the declining marginal utility curve is also assumed to apply to most goods in addition to money. A concave utility function implies that an individual dislikes taking risks, or is risk averse. That is, a person will sacrifice some of the expected value of a lottery in order to receive an amount of money for certain. For example, when faced with a fifty-fifty gamble of receiving $200 or $0, the individual would accept an amount less than $100, the expected value, in order to avoid facing the gamble.
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a quiet interlude
Following Bernoullian theory, the subjective value that people place on a good is meant to reflect their strength of preference for that good. (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) . The axioms were almost immediately recognised as important in the economics community, not least because it proved easier to judge the intuitive plausibility of specific axioms than the utility representation -i.e., expected utility maximisation -that they imply. Expected utility theory was refined in the years immediately following von Neumann and Morgenstern's initial exposition (Marschak, 1950; Samuelson, 1952) , and its crucial axioms are now thought to be ordering, continuity and independence (Camerer, 1995) . Although some contend that there is no broadly accepted definition of behavioural economics (Heukelom, 2012), the discipline is commonly thought to focus upon the set of observations that show that people often systematically, and therefore seemingly deliberately, violate the assumptions of rational choice theory and the broader assumptions of standard economic theory, which we will consider later. The challenges to the axioms, particularly the independence axiom, were the origins of empirical behavioural economics, and thus a good student of behavioural public policy ought to be familiar with them.
Before describing the axioms, it is important to note that although the terms risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably in the popular discourse, in economics they have distinct meanings. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's axiomatic framework was developed for decision making under conditions of risk, where probabilities are objectively known. For example, there is a 50 per cent chance that a fair coin will land heads up. Uncertainty, or ambiguity, refers to an event where the occurrence of a particular outcome falls within a range of probabilities. For instance, there might be a 15-30 per cent chance of rain tomorrow. Leonard Savage provided an axiomatic framework for expected utility theory under conditions of uncertainty, and developed what is known as subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954) . Strictly speaking, subjective expected utility theory can be applied more broadly than expected utility theory in real world settings, because specific probabilities of events are rarely objectively known. However, Savage argued that when faced To return to the axioms, ordering imposes two requirements on people; namely, that their preferences should be complete and transitive. Completeness is simply the requirement that people are able to express a preference between two or more goods. For example, if we select motor cars as the relevant goods, an individual should be able to state that he prefers a Mercedes over a BMW, or vice versa, or that these two types of car are equally preferable to him; that is to say, he is indifferent to the choice of car. Transitivity implies that if an individual prefers a Mercedes over a BMW, but prefers a BMW over a Jaguar, then he ought also to prefer the Mercedes over the Jaguar. A violation of transitivity is known as an intransitive cycle, which can have serious negative economic consequences for the perpetrator. For example, assume that an individual prefers a particular Mercedes over his own BMW, prefers the BMW over a Jaguar that he has noticed, but also prefers the Jaguar over the Mercedes. He would therefore be willing to swap his BMW plus pay a premium, say, $x, for the Mercedes. He now owns the Mercedes, but he would be willing to swap this car plus pay a premium, say, $y, for the Jaguar. He now owns the Jaguar, but would be willing to swap that car, plus pay a premium, say, $z, for his original BMW. Therefore, in terms of car ownership he is back where he started, with the BMW, but has paid out $x + $y + $z in the process. If he were to repeat this cycle, he may soon find himself without enough money to buy petrol. In the economic literature, this is known as a money pump, an economically irrational cycle that can lead to bankruptcy.
Continuity requires that if an individual is faced with three goods, there will be a specific, unique probability such that he will be indifferent between a gamble that offers a chance of the most and least preferable goods, and the intermediate good for certain. For example, if money is the good being offered, and, as is likely, an assuming rationality 9
Cambridge University Press 978-1-316-51026-1 -The Origins of Behavioural Public Policy Adam Oliver Excerpt More Information www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press individual prefers $20 over $10 and $10 over $5, there will be a unique probability, say, p, where the individual is indifferent between receiving $10 for certain, and a gamble offering p chance of $20 and (1−p) chance of $5. As we will see later, continuity is central to the utility elicitation instruments, but has not been subjected to much attention in the behavioural economics literature.
Independence, sometimes call separability (Broome, 1991) or the sure thing principle (Savage, 1954) , is the most controversial axiom of expected utility theory, and implies that the intrinsic value that an individual places on any particular outcome will not be influenced by varying other possible outcomes on offer, or by varying the size of the probability of the outcome occurring. The implication of the independence axiom is that if an individual is asked to choose between two or more lotteries, then a common outcome that has the same chance of occurring across the lotteries will be deemed irrelevant to the individual when making his choice. The chance of the common outcome occurring is a sure thing irrespective of what is chosen, and the individual ought only to base his choice on the consequences that distinguish the options he faces.
Some of the main challenges to the independence axiom will be detailed in Chapter 2, but an indication that the value that people attach to different outcomes or goods is often dependent on the other possibilities that are available in the choice that they are presented with, even when there is no risk or uncertainty, is given by a phenomenon known as asymmetric dominance (Huber et al., 1982) . For example, a person is more likely to choose to buy a 28-inch television set for $600 instead of a 24-inch television set for $500 when a 26-inch set for $650 is also included in the choice set. The 26-inch set serves as a decoy, affecting the value that people attach to the 28-inch set by making it appear better value for money than would otherwise be the case.
Lotteries with up to three outcomes can be plotted in a Marschak-Machina triangle (1989) . The axioms of expected utility theory have implications for the shape of the indifference loci within the triangle, with the indifference loci depicting the preference
